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Abstract
The European Union (EU) is willing to participate as much as possible at the negotia-
tion table to meet the challenges that the Arctic poses and benefit from the opportuni-
ties it offers. But the relationship between the EU and the Arctic is ‘problematic’ for 
both external (EU difficulties particularly with Canada and Russia) and internal rea-
sons (substantive competing interests and ambivalent policies, discrepancies among 
member States and within EU institutions …). Without a specific policy tradition or a 
direct geographical link, the EU has not yet gained legitimacy to become a key ‘Arctic 
actor’ or stakeholder. The EU needs to take an active stance on issues relating to the 
Arctic (including maritime delimitation, which is critical for determining navigational 
rights, the scope of Art. 234, etc.); because otherwise, the EU reduces its chances to 
make an impact on the relevant international fora and, ultimately, on making and 
implementing Arctic international law.
Keywords
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 Introduction: Arctic Global Governance?
There has been, and there still will be, much discussion on the role of non-
Arctic States and other non-Arctic international actors in Arctic governance, 
i.e., international cooperation on Arctic issues. Since the renewed ‘visibility’ 
of Arctic matters in 2007—when it was broadcasted that Russia had started 
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the so-called ‘race for the Arctic’ …—,1 it seems that several old and ‘new’2 
Arctic issues have gained a global dimension, thus going beyond the exclu-
sive interests of Arctic States: scientific research, security issues, indigenous 
peoples’ rights, sustainable development—including exploration, exploitation 
and conservation of fisheries—, mineral resources, navigation, tourism, envi-
ronmental protection—particularly the fight against climate change and its 
consequences—, among many other topics.3 Somehow, the undoubted rel-
evance acquired by the Arctic today (from political, social, economic, geostra-
tegic and scientific perspectives) entails an intermingling of challenges, risks 
and opportunities. Climate change poses a huge environmental challenge (ice 
loss, sea level rise, etc.), but it also opens vast economic opportunities in the 
Arctic, such as easier access to resources, transpolar shipping through Russia’s 
Northern Sea Route (NSR) or the American Northwest Passage (NWP). At 
the same time, these opportunities present new environmental risks and 
challenges—mainly related to overexploitation and pollution—in a very sen-
sitive region.
International cooperation on Arctic issues involves different interests and 
stakeholders, based not only on geographical reasons (consider the concentric 
circles around the North Pole that expand over the Arctic Ocean, the Arctic 
Polar Circle and beyond), but also due to socio-economic and political factors.
Regarding Arctic issues, we need to take into account three different 
groups of States and actors. First, the coastal Arctic States, that is: Canada, the 
Kingdom of Denmark (Greenland), Norway, the Russian Federation and the 
United States of America. Second, we find other Arctic States whose sovereign 
territory includes areas above the Arctic Polar Circle (Finland, Iceland and 
Sweden). Arctic States hold formal and informal meetings on a regular basis 
1   On 2 August 2007, in the Arktika 2007 expedition, two Russian mini-submarines planted a 
titanium Russian flag on the seabed under the North Pole, giving rise to a media narrative 
filled with inflamed political rhetoric and sensationalist metaphors, such as comparing that 
fact with the arrival of man on the moon. As is now well known, there is not really a ‘race’ 
for the Arctic, but a coordinated effort of Arctic States, particularly coastal Arctic States, to 
govern the region.
2   The reports about the Arctic ice loss have coincided with others about the Arctic holding a 
non-negligible percentage of the world’s remaining undiscovered conventional oil and gas 
resources.
3   On the coexistence of Arctic States and international cooperation on Arctic issues, see 
C Cinelli, El Ártico ante el derecho del mar contemporáneo (Tirant lo Blanch-Universidad 
de Sevilla, Valencia, 2012). On the legal challenge that climate change entails in the Arctic, see 
M Sobrido-Prieto (ed), Espacios polares y cambio climático. Desafíos jurídico-internacionales 
(Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, 2017).
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at the Arctic Council (AC), which was founded in 1996 as a high-level inter-
governmental forum for purposes of cooperation and coordination on matters 
of common concern. Decisions are made by consensus and Arctic indigenous 
peoples’ organizations hold the unique position of ‘permanent participants’, 
which gives them full consultation rights in Council decision-making.4 Third, 
there are other interested States and other actors, that is, non-Arctic States and 
non-wholly-Arctic international actors that have presented their ‘credentials’ 
as Arctic stakeholders and have been accepted by Arctic States as such.5
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)6 is applicable 
to the Arctic. Though the US is yet to accede to it, the Convention has been 
affirmed as the ‘general regulation’7 on Arctic ocean governance by the coastal 
Arctic States themselves.8 All coastal Arctic States possess a 200-nautical-mile 
(nm) exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and their continental shelves extend to 
a distance of 200 nm from the baselines from which the breadth of the ter-
ritorial sea is measured; however, the EEZ has not been established around 
the Svalbard archipelago. In this regard, Norway (2006), Russia (2007), Canada 
(2013), and Denmark (2014) have launched projects to provide a basis for sea-
bed claims on extended continental shelves beyond the 200-nm limit in some 
areas.9 Beyond the marine disputes over limits of the outer  continental shelves, 
4   In 2014 the Arctic Economic Council (AEC) was launched during Canada’s AC chairmanship 
(2013–2015, Leona Aglukkaq being the first Inuk ever to chair the AC) to address the very real 
economic challenges of Northerners with a strong focus on the northern voice.
5   As we will see, numerous States and the European Union (EU) have expressed a keen in-
terest in joining the cooperation in Arctic issues through the AC, but in 2009 the Council 
(i.e., the Arctic States) re-evaluated the observer role and adopted new acceptance criteria. 
Also, in 2013 a new network of international dialogue and cooperation on the future of the 
Arctic—the so-called Arctic Circle—was launched in order to strengthen the policy-making 
process by bringing together as many Arctic and international players as possible. Held in 
Reykjavik (Iceland), the 2016 Assembly was well attended by more than 2.000 participants 
from 50 States and could be depicted as an open invitation to interested parties worldwide to 
exchange ideas on a wide range of issues.
6   United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, in force 
16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 396.
7   Without prejudice to other ‘specific rules’, such as the International Maritime Organization’s 
(IMO) International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (‘Polar Code’) (Res. MEPC. 264 
(68)/21/Add.1, Annex 10, 15 May 2015, in force January 2017).
8   Illulisat Declaration, adopted by the coastal Arctic States on 28 May 2008. Available at http://
www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf; accessed 25 August 2017.
9   Because the United Sates has not acceded to the LOSC, it did not yet make its submission. 
Other Arctic countries, including Russia, Norway and Denmark, have filed their own claims 
with the Commission, the Norwegian and Danish claims opposing Russian demands. In the 
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coastal Arctic States generally show a friendly attitude concerning other ongo-
ing tensions and disputes in order to promote coordinated efforts on Arctic 
governance and to preserve the common interests they all share. This attitude 
can be seen, for example, in the only unresolved claim over landmasses (a dis-
pute between Denmark and Canada over Has Island), in the dispute between 
Canada and the United States over the legal status of the NWP’s waters (Canada 
claiming jurisdiction over the NWP and the United States claiming that these 
are international waters), or even in the Russia-United States and Canada ten-
sions (Syria, Eastern Europe, mainly Ukraine …).
 The EU in the Arctic, the Arctic in the EU
One of the most important, if not the most important, international actors 
which claim to be recognised as an Arctic stakeholder is the European Union 
(EU), as distinct from its member States acting either individually or col-
lectively. The EU has not designed and developed any comprehensive and 
integrated Arctic policy.10 National policies overlap with EU policy.11 There are 
different reasons which may explain the ‘dubious’ EU Arctic policy. None of 
the European Communities founding States was an Arctic State, and none 
of the coastal Arctic States is a member of the EU (except Denmark, which 
acceded to the European Communities in 1973 and was one of the EU founding 
States in 1993, though by then Greenland had already “increased” its autono-
mous status within the Kingdom of Denmark and had exited the European 
Communities).12 Finland and Sweden acceded to the EU in 1994. Mainly 
   Illulisat Declaration, the coastal Arctic States also agreed to negotiate disputes peacefully 
in the event of an overlapping claim over extended continental shelves. See C Cinelli, ‘The 
Law of the Sea and the Arctic Ocean’ (2011) 2(1) Arctic Review on Law and Politics 4–24.
10   See M Campins-Eritja, ‘The European Union and the North: Towards the Development of 
an EU Arctic Policy?’ (2013) 27 Ocean Yearbook 459–585.
11   Amongst EU member States, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Poland, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom have issued or are issuing Arctic or Polar 
policy papers. Non-EU member States that have issued an Arctic strategy or policy paper 
include Canada, Iceland, India, Japan, Norway, the Russian Federation and the United 
States of America.
12   Greenland had voted to leave the European Communities in 1982 and left in 1985. Since 
1985, the relation between Greenland and the EU is regulated by: on the one hand, specific 
provisions on import of fishery products originating in Greenland set out in the Protocol 
(No. 34) on special arrangements for Greenland, annexed to the Treaty on the European 
Union (TEU) (OJ C 202, 7 June 2016, 13) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
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because of the perceptions about the EU common fisheries policy, Norwegian 
people rejected twice (1972 and 1994) Norway’s ratification of the acces-
sion treaties which had already been negotiated and signed. More recently, 
in 2009, Iceland applied to become a member of the EU, but in 2013 suspended 
its application.13 However, along with Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway are 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) members and parties to the European 
Economic Area (EEA) agreement14 (which excludes fisheries). The EEA agree-
ment is an important and decisive factor in shaping the parties other than 
EU member States’ domestic legislation.15 The EU has strategic partnerships 
with Canada, Russia and the United States. Those are substantial links in order 
to justify the EU interest in the Arctic.16 The renewed visibility of the Arctic 
explains the idea of a much closer cooperation in Arctic governance.
The geographical boundaries of the EU partially overlap with those of the 
Arctic and EU membership raises several questions, such as: the role of Arctic 
Union (TFEU) (OJ C 202, 7 June 2016, 47); and, on the other hand, subject to these spe-
cific provisions, the provisions in Articles 198 to 203 of TFEU (Part Four of the TFEU, 
‘Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories’, Arts. 198–204), as Greenland is 
listed in Annex II to the TFEU (Overseas Countries and Territories to which the Provisions 
of Part Four of the TFEU Apply) beside those territories and countries associated with the 
EU as non-European countries and territories which have special relations with Denmark, 
France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. In 2015, a joint declaration about closer 
relations between the EU and Greenland was signed by Denmark, Greenland and the 
EU. Anyway, citizens of Greenland are EU citizens owing to their Danish citizenship.
13   There are contradictory statements about whether Iceland has or has not withdrawn the 
application.
14   Agreement on the European Economic Area (OJ L 1, 3 January 1994, 3).
15   Iceland and Norway are also associated countries in the EU’s Horizon 2020 Framework 
Programme for Research and Innovation.
16   ‘With three Member States and two European Economic Area members being Arctic 
states, the EU has a strategic interest in the Arctic remaining a low-tension area, with 
ongoing cooperation ensured by the Arctic Council, a well-functioning legal framework, 
and solid political and security cooperation. The EU will contribute to this through 
enhanced work on climate action and environmental research, sustainable development, 
telecommunications, and search & rescue, as well as concrete cooperation with Arctic 
states, institutions, indigenous peoples and local communities’ (Shared Vision, Common 
Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security 
Policy, presented by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
and Vice President of the European Commission, Federica Mogherini, to the Heads of 
State or Government in an urgent European Council meeting largely devoted to the 
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and non-Arctic EU member States in developing a EU Arctic roadmap and pol-
icy, bearing in mind the existence of EU member States’ national Arctic poli-
cies; if and to what extent do Arctic EU member States ‘represent’ the EU in the 
Arctic cooperation institutions (e.g., AC);17 the influence of the EU through its 
law, including international agreements, particularly the EEA agreement; and 
the key acceptance of the EU as an Arctic stakeholder by the Arctic States and, 
particularly, by the coastal Arctic States. Although the EU wishes to address 
emerging challenges in cooperation with the Arctic partners, the EU does 
not seem to believe in its ‘right’ or ‘legitimacy’18 as an Arctic stakeholder, and 
(at least, some of) the coastal Arctic States are suspicious about ‘sharing’ the 
Arctic with such an influent actor.19 The status of the EU in the AC might 
illustrate this paradox. Several non-Arctic EU member States are permanent 
observers, including Spain,20 but the EU has remained excluded from  acquiring 
17   See C Cinelli’s contribution to this special issue (‘Brief consideration on EU competence 
within the Arctic cooperation’).
18   On how the EU can achieve legitimacy in the Arctic context, see ZV Yaneva, ‘Legitimate 
EU on the Arctic stage? Policy and interests’ (2016) 20 Spanish Yearbook of International 
Law 233–254.
19   As Denmark, Finland and Sweden are members of the AC, some potential concerns 
among some of the (other) AC member States might relate to the obligation of EU mem-
ber States to ‘support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly 
in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity’, to coordinate their action in the AC and ‘up-
hold the Union’s position’ in the AC and ‘keep the other member States and the High 
Representative informed of any matter of common interest’ (Arts. 24.3 and 34 TEU). 
Most Arctic issues are related to areas in which EU treaties confer competence on the EU 
(Arts. 2 to 6 TFEU), either exclusively (e.g., the conservation of marine biological resources 
under the common fisheries policy) or, more frequently, a competence shared with EU 
member States (e.g., fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological resources; 
environment; transport; energy; and research).
20   The seven EU member States accepted so far as observers in the AC are France, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom. From the 1996 Ottawa 
Declaration on the Establishment of the AC, and governed by the AC Rules of Procedure, 
there was a difference between permanent participant status (Northern Indigenous 
Peoples’ Organizations) and observer status in the AC. This last position was open to 
non-Arctic States, inter-governmental or inter-parliamentary organizations, universal or 
regional, and NGOs that the Council determines can contribute to its work, primarily at 
the level of working groups. Since the Salekhard Ministerial Meeting in 2006, applications 
to obtain AC observer status were received from China, Italy and the Republic of Korea, 
and these states participated as ad hoc observers. In addition, the European Commission 
was approved as an ad hoc observer to a number of SAO meetings and has applied to 
become an observer to the AC. To accommodate the growing interest of States such as 
China, South Korea and India, and of the EU, to participate in Council activities in a less 
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this status,21 as symbolic as that acquisition might be.22 It is not the case that 
the EU economic and financial crisis might find a solution or mitigation in the 
use of Arctic resources (e.g., access to new sea routes, fishing quotas, gas and 
hydrocarbons, etc.). But it seems that not only are some of the governments of 
Arctic States reluctant with regard to a much more intense involvement of the 
EU in Arctic cooperation, but also the organizations representing the indig-
enous peoples living in the region.23
Furthermore, the EU has competences conferred by its States members in 
Arctic -related matters (including the development of a maritime policy, the EU 
limited manner, the observer role was re-evaluated at the Tromsø Ministerial Meeting 
(2009), abandoning the distinction between permanent and ad hoc observers and adopt-
ing criteria that existing observers and new applicants would need to observe in order to be 
accepted into the AC. At the 2013 Kiruna Ministerial Meeting (2013), the Council took 
note of the adoption by Senior Arctic Officials of a new ‘observer manual’ that gov-
erns the activities of observer States and organizations; recognizing that an increase in 
observers could affect the balance of the AC, member States developed more robust stan-
dards, including requisite recognition of the special role of the permanent participants, 
but accepted Italy, along with China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and India. See the 
2013 Kiruna Declaration at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/ 
93/MM08_Final_Kiruna_declaration_w_signature.pdf ?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
About observer status in the AC (including criteria for admittance, role of observers 
and AC Observer Manual for Subsidiary Bodies adopted by Senior Arctic Officials at 
the 2013 Kiruna Ministerial Meeting), see https://www.arctic-council.org/en/about-us/
arctic-council/observers.
21   The EU’s application was received ‘affirmatively’ at the Kiruna Ministerial Meeting (2013) 
and the EU was accredited with the strange ‘observer-in-principle’ status, which was to 
replace the previous ad hoc regime, but a final decision was deferred until the dispute 
with Canada resulting from EU bans on seal hunting and the Arctic oil and gas production 
had been resolved. In April 2015, Russia also vetoed the EU’s status in retaliation against 
its sanctions arising from the conflict in Ukraine.
22   The EU not only is active in programs in and channels financial support to the Arctic 
regions of EU member States, but it has also always participated in AC meetings and has 
contributed to working groups, and will continue to do so. See A Østhagen, ‘In or Out? The 
Symbolism of the EU’s Arctic Council Bid’, 18 June 2013, The Arctic Institute. Available at 
http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/; accessed 25 August 2017.
23   The Inuit of Inuit Nunaat (from Greenland to Canada, Alaska and the coastal regions 
of Chukotka, Russia) do not deny the sovereignty of those States over the Arctic, but 
associate this sovereignty to their right to self-determination. They claim the need for 
global cooperation, but also stress their inclusion as active partners on Arctic sovereignty 
(A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic, adopted by the Inuit 
Circumpolar Council, Tromsø, Norway, 28 April 2009); http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/
uploads/3/0/5/4/30542564/declaration_on_resource_development_a3_final.pdf.
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being a party to the LOSC with no jurisdictional advantages or disadvantages 
compared to States parties),24 but Arctic issues affect very different EU poli-
cies and actions, both internally and externally. The great division between 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), on the one hand, and internal 
policies and other external action policies, on the other, is mainly reflected in 
the functioning and procedures of the EU institutions. But every EU policy and 
every action entails a fragile balance and a compromise between contradict-
ing interests of member States and/or EU institutions (European Parliament, 
Council and Commission). The EU ban on seal products (2009), later amended 
to address the World Trade Organization (WTO) decision,25 did not help to 
make Arctic friends. But some positions of the European Parliament have 
been particularly unwelcome in the Arctic, notably the 2008 Resolution, which 
advocated pursuing the opening of international negotiations aimed at lead-
ing to the adoption of an Antarctic Treaty System-inspired international treaty 
for the protection of the Arctic; and the proposal to establish a moratorium on 
any offshore hydrocarbon exploration and extraction operations in the Arctic. 
Though the European Parliament abandoned the idea of an Antarctic-inspired 
treaty and the opinion of the Environmental Committee during Parliamentary 
discussions did not survive in the text of the 2013 Directive on safety of off-
shore oil and gas operations,26 the opponents of the participation of the EU in 
Arctic governance argued that the EU is far away from the political realities of 
the Arctic.
Anyway, there are a number of ways through which the EU may participate 
or have an impact on Arctic governance: either indirectly, through its influence 
in making or adjusting ‘general’ international law applicable in the Arctic and 
of ‘Arctic-specific’ international law, bearing in mind that the EU does not pur-
port to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime for the Arctic; 
or directly, through ‘general’ or ‘Arctic- specific’ EU law—which is international 
law but with several original features—and, subsequently, by means of EEA-
relevant law, mainly because the EU influences the domestic legislation of its 
member States and of the parties to the EEA agreement.
24   Annex IX of the LOSC (‘Participation by international organizations’).
25   The EU seal regime was found to be in violation of WTO law at least between 2009 and 
2015. See M. Hennig’s contribution to this special issue (‘The Untouchable Nature of 
the ‘EU Seal Regime’—Is the European Union Liable for the Damages Suffered by the 
Canadian Inuit due to the Violation of WTO Law in EC-Seal Products?’).
26   Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013, 
amending Directive 2004/35/EC (OJ L 178, 28.6.2013).
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In this regard, it is necessary to take also into account that, ‘echoing’ the 
classic debate on monism and dualism (interrelationship between interna-
tional law and States’ national laws), EU law has emerged as a ‘new’27 law, dis-
tinct from both international law and EU member States’ national laws. The 
interrelationship between legal systems has gained complexity, as EU law is 
frequently made to implement ‘common’ or ‘ordinary’ international law (EU 
treaties and international agreements stand as the ‘epitome’ of the overlapping 
of international law and EU law, ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’, respectively), which 
once transformed or incorporated into EU law acquires a ‘non-common’ or 
‘extraordinary’ nature (primacy, direct effect, etc.) within EU law in EU mem-
ber States’ national law, in accordance with well-settled case law of the (now) 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
 EU Law Applicable in the Arctic … and a ‘Specific EU Arctic Law’?
On the basis of ‘primary’ EU law,28 the EU produces ‘secondary’ legal acts 
(regulations, directives and decisions) and implements international agree-
ments. In this way, the EU has adopted several acts in the areas of environ-
ment and climate change, social and cultural changes, energy, development of 
offshore oil and gas resources, mining, land use, research, maritime transport 
27   Judgment of 5 February 1963, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van 
Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration—Reference for a preliminary 
ruling: Tariefcommissie—Pays-Bas, Case 26–62: ‘the [EU] constitutes a new legal order of 
international law for the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights, 
albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only member States 
but also their nationals. Independently of the legislation of member States, [EU] law 
therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon 
them rights which become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only where 
they are expressly granted by the treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the treaty 
imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon the member States and 
upon the institutions of the [EU]’.
28   The EU was established in the TEU and TFEU (‘primary’ EU law). The freedoms and prin-
ciples set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 
2000, as adapted in Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007), have the same legal value as the 
Treaties. The Charter was adopted in 2000 (see OJ C 364, 18.12.2000) and adapted for 
mention in the Lisbon Treaty in 2007 (OJ C 303, 14.12.2007). The fundamental rights are 
also guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (Rome, 4 November 1950) ETS No.005, and as they result from 
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, and ‘shall constitute general 
principles of the Union’s law’ (Art. 6 TEU).
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and fisheries, including research activity and regional funding destined to 
improve living conditions of local communities,29 which are not directly aimed 
at the Arctic, but sometimes specifically refer to the Arctic,30 and have an effect 
on the Arctic.31 Nevertheless, from the territorial scope provisions32 follow the 
limited direct application of this EU ‘general’ law: to Greenland as an overseas 
territory (also in accordance with the specific provisions of Art. 204 TFEU and 
Protocol nº 34), and to the Arctic territories of Finland and Sweden. The Arctic 
EU member States are the natural territory of some Arctic indigenous peoples 
whose rights as citizens are protected by EU law and might be considered by 
the CJEU. There is still the opportunity to influence non-EU Arctic territories, 
policies and law via the EEA agreement, because once EU law is considered 
29   See A Airoldi’s report, issued by the NCM, ‘The European Union and the Arctic—
Policies and Actions’, 2008. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.6027/ANP2008-729; accessed 
25 August 2017, and the updates 2010. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.6027/ANP2010-763; 
accessed 25 August 2017 and 2014. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.6027/ANP2014-565; 
accessed 25 August 2017. For comprehensive and up-to-date information to 2014 see also 
the main outcome of the preparatory action ‘Strategic Environmental Impact Assessment 
of Development of the Arctic’, led by the Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland and 
financed by DG Environment, the report ‘Strategic Assessment of Development of the 
Arctic’ (SADA), September 2014. Available at http://www.arcticinfo.eu/en/sada; accessed 
25 August 2017.
30   For example, the Communication from the Commission ‘An EU Strategy on adaptation to 
climate change’ [COM(2013), 216 final, Brussels, 16.4.2013] specifically refers to the Arctic’s 
particular vulnerability to the impacts of climate change. Available at http://ec.europa 
.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2013/EN/1-2013-216-EN-F1-1.Pdf; accessed 25 August 2017; 
the Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘International 
ocean governance: an agenda for the future of our oceans’ [JOIN(2016) 49 final, Brussels 
10.11.2016], which does not have a specific Arctic focus, although, referring to the promo-
tion of regional fisheries management and cooperation in key ocean areas to fill regional 
governance gaps, it is stressed that the central Arctic Ocean is ‘one of the most fragile sea 
regions on the planet’ and that, in line with its integrated Arctic policy, ‘the EU should 
seek to ensure sustainable development in and around the region on the basis of interna-
tional cooperation’. Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?ur
i=CELEX:52016JC0049&from=EN; accessed 25 August 2017.
31   The study ‘EU Arctic Footprint and Policy Assessment. Final Report’, EcoLogic, Berlin, 
2010, deals with the improvement of the effectiveness of EU environmental policies with 
respect to the Arctic region. Available at http://arctic-footprint.eu/sites/default/files/
AFPA_Final_Report.pdf; accessed 26 August 2017.
32   EU law is applicable to member States, though EU legal acts are binding in accordance 
with Art. 288 TFEU and there are specific provisions on their territorial scope (Arts. 52 
TEU and 355 TFEU).
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‘EEA-relevant’—i.e., within areas covered by the EEA agreement—it becomes 
EEA law and must be therefore incorporated into Icelandic and Norwegian 
domestic laws regardless of the (subsequent) will of these States.33 To be con-
sidered as EEA-relevant, an EU legal act must meet both substantive (Art. 1 
EEA agreement) and geographical (Art. 126 EEA agreement) requirements. In 
some cases, the determination of the substantive scope of the EEA agreement 
is controversial (e.g., there is an obligation to cooperate closely on environ-
mental issues, but a ‘purely’ environmental EU legal act might not necessar-
ily be considered EEA-relevant by itself).34 Nevertheless, it is the geographical 
limitation of the EEA agreement which has turned out to be a decisive obstacle 
for implementing EU legislation by means of the EEA agreement in the marine 
Arctic. First, the Norwegian authorities expressly excluded the territory of 
Svalbard.35 Second, it is debatable whether the EEA agreement applies to the 
EEZ and continental shelf. Notably, the Norwegian authorities argue that EU 
legal acts which apply to the EEZ or continental shelf are not EEA-relevant 
33   Non-EU member States that are parties to the EEA agreement did not confer legislative, 
executive or judicial jurisdiction on the EU, so EU institutions have no competence over 
the EFTA States. Therefore, EU law is not directly binding and is not granted primacy and 
direct effect in EFTA States’ domestic legislation. The EU law that is EEA-relevant is inte-
grated into the EEA agreement and, subsequently, legal acts or international agreements 
are, or EEA/EFTA States have to make them so, part of their internal legal order (Arts. 7 
and 102 EEA agreement). The EU law adopted after 1 January 1994—when the EEA agree-
ment entered into force—is integrated into the EEA agreement through the Annexes fol-
lowing a ‘relevant EEA Joint Committee decision’. This means that a legal matter (the 
EEA relevance of EU law) is determined, on the basis of the substantive and geographical 
scope of EEA agreement (Arts. 1 and 126 EEA agreement), by diplomatic means. It must 
be stressed that the so-called EEA two-pillar structure established in the EEA agreement, 
with organs composed of representatives of EU institutions and of EFTA States, does not 
include an EEA Court, though it is possible to ask for a ruling by the CJEU. Sometimes it 
may not be clear whether an EFTA State’s piece of national legislation is formally imple-
menting EEA-relevant EU law or if it is merely a piece of national legislation with no 
‘connection’ to EU law. But when an EFTA State formally implements EEA-relevant EU 
law, EU practice and the decisions of the CJEU will be the reference when interpreting the 
content of national law.
34   The implications for the functioning of the internal market and the competition rules 
are the main factors, but the legal basis, the subject and the purpose, as well as the rela-
tion to an EEA-relevant EU legal act at stake are also pertinent factors to assess the EEA 
relevance test.
35   Otherwise subject to the “Svalbard Treaty”, Treaty concerning the Archipelago of 
Spitsbergen, signed in Paris on 9 February 1920 (2 LNTS 41: 7–19).
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because they do not meet the geographical scope of the EEA agreement:36 for 
example the 2008 MSFD Directive,37 the 2013 Directive on safety of offshore oil 
and gas operations,38 or the 2016 Regulation on aviation safety.39
Several circumstances have impeded for a long time the adoption of an in-
tegrated and coherent EU Arctic policy and, even more so, EU ‘Arctic-specific’ 
legislation. The above-mentioned fragile inter-institutional balance based 
upon the complicated interaction between the EU institutions designed 
in the Treaties—notably the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission—including discrepancies amongst these institutions, and con-
tradictory interests amongst representatives of different member States in the 
Council, are some of those circumstances. Similarly, an increasing sense of 
diplomatic prudence, together with geographical, political, legal and material 
constraints, have limited the EU’s ability.
Despite some occasional references to the Arctic since 1989 (related to 
ozone layer depletion and environmental conditions, the climate change-
security connection, the concern over future activities, and the proximity to 
Russia), the ‘Arctic window’ in the Northern Dimension policy (ND),40 and the 
consideration of the Arctic in the EU maritime policy,41 the EU awareness of 
36   For this analysis, see E Johansen’s contribution to this special issue (‘The EU Influence on 
Norwegian Domestic Legislation for the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment’).
37   Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 
establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental 
policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive) (OJ L 164, 25.6.2008).
38   See C Cinelli, ‘Law of the Sea, the European Union Arctic Policy and Corporate Social 
Responsibility’ (2016) 30 Ocean Yearbook 242–266.
39   Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/1199 pf 22 July 2016 amending Regulation (EU) 
No. 965/2012 as regards operational approval of performance-based navigation, certifica-
tion and oversight of data services providers and helicopter offshore operations, and cor-
recting that Regulation (OJ L 198, 23.7.2016).
40   The EU Arctic policy was preceded, once Finland and Sweden acceded to the EU, by the 
ND, which is a joint policy between EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland initiated in 1999 and 
renewed in 2006, aiming at providing a framework to: promote dialogue and concrete 
cooperation; strengthen stability, well-being and intensified economic cooperation; pro-
mote economic integration, competitiveness and sustainable development in Northern 
Europe. The ND led the EU, for example, to participate in regional and sub-regional 
institutions—such as the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC). Amongst others, also par-
ticipating are EU member States in their national capacity and regional Councils, such as 
AC, BEAC, the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and the Nordic Council of Ministers 
(NCM). Canada and the United States participate as observers.
41   Since the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘An 
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the Arctic relevance has been translated into specific action only since 2008. 
After two previous EU communications on the Arctic (2008 and 2012),42 some 
European Parliament Resolutions,43 the EU Council’s conclusions on Arctic 
issues,44 and opinions expressed by other EU organs,45 on 27 April 2016 the 
European Commission and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy presented an ‘integrated and coherent’ EU Arctic 
policy.46 This new policy document has been developed at the request of 
Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union’, COM(2007), 575 final, Brussels, 
10.10.2007. Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/ 
commission_europeenne/com/2007/0575/COM_COM(2007)0575_EN.pdf; accessed 26 
August 2017.
42   Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
‘The European Union and the Arctic’, COM(2008)763 final, Brussels, 20.11.2008. Available 
at http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/arctic_region/docs/com_08_763_en.pdf; accessed 
26 August 2017, and Joint Communication from the Commission and the EU High 
Representative for foreign affairs and security policy ‘Developing a European Union 
Policy towards the Arctic Region: progress since 2008 and next steps’, JOIN(2012), 
19 final, Brussels, 26.6.2012. Available at http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/arctic_ 
region/docs/join_2012_19.pdf; accessed 26 August 2017.
43   For example, the 2008 resolution on Arctic governance. Available at http://www.europarl 
.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6-TA-2008-474; accessed 
26 August 2017, the 2011 Resolution on a sustainable EU policy for the High North. Available 
at http://www.europar.europaeu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP/TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2011-
0024+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN; accessed 26 August 2017; and the 2014 resolution on the EU 
strategy for the Arctic. Available at http://www.europar.europaeu/sides/getDoc.do?type=
TA&language=EN&referebce=P7-TA-2014-0236; accessed 26 August 2017.
44   For example, its 8 December 2009 conclusions on Arctic issues. Available at http:// 
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/111814.pdf; accessed 
26 August 2017 or 12 May 2014 conclusions on developing a EU policy towards the Arctic 
Region. Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/
EN/foraff/142554.pdf; accessed 25 August 2017.
45   See, for example, the European Economic and Social Committee’s opinion issued in April 
2013 on ‘EU Arctic Policy to address globally emerging interests in the region—a view of 
civil society’. Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CEL
EX:52012IE2179&from=EN; accessed 26 August 2017.
46   Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council ‘An integrated 
European Union policy for the Arctic’, JOIN(2016) 21 final, Brussels, 27.4.2016. Available 
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0021&from=
EN, accessed 26 August 2017 . See the analysis in A. Stępień and A. Raspotnik, ‘The EU’s 
new Arctic Communication: not-so-integrated, not-so-disappointing?’ (2016) The Arctic 
Institute, 28 and 29 April, and 3 May 2016. Available at http://www.thearcticinstitute 
.org; accessed 26 August 2017 and ArCticles-Arctic Center Papers, 3 May 2016. Available at 
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the European Parliament and the Council47 and it is based on an indicative 
roadmap.48 It sets out the case for an EU policy that focuses on advancing 
international cooperation in responding to the impacts of climate change on 
the Arctic’s fragile environment, and on promoting and contributing to sus-
tainable development, particularly in the European part of the Arctic, and 
attaches particular importance to research, science and innovation.49 The EU’s 
goals and ambitions are yet unclear. There are hardly any proposals for legal 
acts or international agreements, and there is no ‘Arctic-specific’ law.50
It is true that the geographical factor is here limiting the EU’s ability. Not 
only does it hinder the implementation of EU law through the EEA agree-
ment in the marine Arctic, it is also an obstacle for the EU regulating, for 
example, Arctic maritime safety and environmental protection. The LOSC sets 
out a careful balance between the rights and obligations of flag, coastal and 
port States. The marine environment is purportedly protected by a universally 
binding minimum legal framework (codified in Part XII of LOSC), and though 
regional or national legislation may offer a more environmentally-friendly reg-
ulation of regional seas, there is a tradition of regulating maritime navigation 
http://www.articcentre.org; accessed 26 August 2017. The policies outlined in the Joint 
Communication have been endorsed in Council conclusions on the Arctic of 20 June 
2016. Available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10400-2016-INIT/
en/pdf; accessed 26 August 2017.
47   Resolution adopted by the European Parliament on 12 March 2014 and conclusions 
adopted by the Council (Foreign Affairs Council) on 12 May 2014.
48   Available at http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2015_eeas_016_arctic_ 
policy_en.pdf; accessed 26 August 2017.
49   The indigenous perspective is nevertheless absent from the 2016 Communication.
50   For example, in relation to climate change and safeguarding the Arctic environment, 
the document affirms that the EU: should continue its engagement in multilateral 
environmental agreements that also have particular relevance to the Arctic, and encour-
age their ratification and implementation [such as the 2004 International Convention 
for the Control and Management of Ship’s Ballast Water and Sediments, done at London, 
13 February 2004 (BWM/CONF/36, 16 February 2004) and the 2013 Minamata Convention 
on Mercury, done at Kumamoto, 10 October 2013 (UNTS, No. I-54669)]; promote establish-
ing marine protected areas in the Arctic; continue to support work at international level 
to prohibit or phase out the use of persistent organic pollutants in the environment; be 
ready to share regulatory (such as the Offshore Safety Directive 2013/30/EU) and techno-
logical best practice with international partners to support the safety and preservation of 
the environment in the region. See, in general, P Grøne, ‘The European Union’s Strategy 
towards the Arctic—A Normative Power in the Region?’ (M.Sc. Thesis, Aalborg University, 
2016). Available at http://www.martinbreum.dk/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/AAUDIR 
-Final-Thesis-.pdf; accessed 27 August 2017.
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at a universal level (IMO), minimizing the options for either a regional or more 
safety-oriented national regulation of navigation of vessels flagged in third 
States. The LOSC confirms the preference for, and prevalence of, ‘generally 
accepted international rules or standards’ relating to maritime safety.51 To sum 
up, national and regional legislation may improve international environmen-
tal law, but may not impose limits on navigation other than those generally 
accepted.
Not wishing to damage the interests of its shipping industry (competitive 
disadvantages, ‘out-flagging’, etc.), the EU regulates shipping mainly based on 
port State jurisdiction,52 less commonly based on coastal State jurisdiction,53 
51   For example, Art. 21 LOSC permits a coastal State to adopt laws and regulations relating 
to innocent passage through the territorial sea, but such laws and regulations shall not 
apply to the design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign vessels ‘unless they 
are giving effect to generally accepted international rules or standards’. See also Arts. 60, 
197, 208, 209, 211, 213–220, 222, 226, 228, 230, 297 LOSC. It is not controversial that every 
flag State may complement or exceed the international rules and standards by imposing 
requirements on vessels flying its flag. In contrast to the detailed regime for coastal States’ 
jurisdiction over foreign vessels, the LOSC does not provide much guidance on the extent 
to which port States may impose requirements other than those generally accepted on 
those vessels voluntarily visiting their ports. It is generally accepted that foreign vessels 
have no general right of access to ports and that port States may condition their entry 
[Arts. 25.2 and 211.3 LOSC, and ICJ judgment of 27 June 1986, Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), para. 213, 
p. 101], but there is no precise regulation of the ‘particular requirements’ which they 
may impose, including the eventual port State’s jurisdiction on casualties and incidents 
beyond its own national maritime zones.
52   Directive 2009/16/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on port State control 
(OJ L 131, 23.4.2009) is especially relevant.
53   The law of the sea imposes strict limitations on coastal States’ jurisdiction over naviga-
tion of foreign vessels through their coastal waters, with regard to legislative measures 
other than the generally accepted international rules and standards or enforcement mea-
sures which anyway involve complex, costly and potentially dangerous actions at sea. The 
three EU Directives that apply to vessels that are merely passing through the waters of the 
member States are: Directive 2002/59/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 June 2002 establishing a Community vessel traffic monitoring and information sys-
tem (VTMIS Directive) (OJ L 208, 5.8.2002); Directive 2005/35/EC on ship-source pollution 
and on the introduction of penalties, including criminal penalties, for pollution offences 
(OJ L 2555, 2005); and Directive 2016/802/EC relating to a reduction in the sulphur content 
of certain liquid fuels (OJ L 132, 2016). These three Directives to some extent even extend 
beyond member States’ coastal waters to the high seas (e.g., Directive 2005/35 applies to 
offences that have taken place even on the high seas).
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and hardly ever exclusively based on flag State jurisdiction,54 even though the 
same EU legal act may simultaneously involve port, coastal and/or flag State 
jurisdictions.
Although there are a number of ways other than regulation by which the 
EU could exert influence in the Arctic, there are options that have not yet been 
fully explored even within the legal domain.55 The EU legal acts exclusively 
focused on vessels flagged in an EU member State do not include a geographic 
limitation, but they might entail a comparative disadvantage for its shipping 
industry.56 Other EU legal acts that apply to vessels flagged in third States, and 
also to vessels flagged in EU member States, may not include a geographical 
limitation and they are therefore applicable to the latter vessels wherever 
they may operate, including the Arctic, though these acts implement wide-
ly accepted IMO and International Labor Organization (ILO) rules.57 The 
54   These EU legal acts that focus on vessels operating in the coastal waters and/or ports of 
member States also apply to vessels flagged in a member State: e.g., Directive 2000/59/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2000 on port reception 
facilities for ship-generated waste and cargo residues (OJ L 332, 28.12.2000); the VTMIS 
Directive (n 53).
55   See HM Ringbom, ‘The European Union and Arctic Shipping’ in N Liu, EA Kirk and 
T Henriksen (eds), The European Union and the Arctic (Brill-Nijhoff, Leiden, 2017) 237–273.
56   For this reason, these legal acts are few and usually target the administration rather 
than vessels, for example: training for seafarers [Directive 2001/25/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 (OJ L 136, 18.5.2001)], repealed by Directive 
2008/106/EC of 18 November 2008 (OJ L323, 3.12.2008)]; ship inspection, survey organiza-
tions and maritime administration requirements [Directive 2009/15/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 (OJ L 131, 28.5.2009)]; compliance with flag 
State requirements [Directive 2009/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 23 April 2009 (OJ L 131, 28.5.2009)]. The exception was, perhaps, EU’s double-hull 
requirements on oil tankers: Regulation (EC) No 457/2007 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 25 April 2007 amending Regulation (EC) No 417/2002 on the 
accelerated phasing-in of double-hull or equivalent design requirements for single-hull 
oil tankers, which provided that ‘[n]o oil tanker carrying heavy grades of oil shall be 
allowed to fly the flag of a Member State unless such tanker is a double-hull tanker’ 
(OJ L 113, 30.4.2007), See HM Ringbom, EU Maritime Safety Policy and International Law 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2008) 172–173.
57   For example, Regulation (EC) No 782/2003 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 14 April 2003 on the prohibition of organotin compounds on ships (OJ L 115, 
9.5.2003); Regulation (EC) No 336/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
15 February 2006 on the implementation of the International Safety Management Code 
within the Community (OJ L 64, 4.3.2006); and Directive 2009/20/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the insurance of shipowners for mari-
time claims (OJ L 131, 28.5.2009).
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applicability of EU legal acts focused on coastal State jurisdiction in an Arctic 
context is limited to the coastal waters of non-EU member Arctic States that 
are parties to the EEA agreement (Iceland and Norway), as long as those acts 
meet the geographical scope of the EEA agreement, or where the obligations 
assumed based on the EEA agreement have been extended beyond this geo-
graphical scope.58 Thus, the EU legal acts based on port State jurisdiction 
imposing requirements also on foreign vessels visiting its member States’ 
ports—which include as a last resort the prohibition to enter any EU member 
State’s port—are those which offer the better options to influence Arctic mari-
time safety and environmental protection: sometimes these legal acts merely 
implement international rules and standards, including the International 
Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (‘Polar Code’);59 whereas at other 
times, EU legal acts apply international rules which have not come into force 
yet;60 and finally, it could be the case that those legal acts implement recom-
mendations61 or include EU requirements that go beyond international rules 
and standards.62 These EU requirements—which may be effective because an 
58   It appears that Iceland and Norway have acknowledged the geographical applicability 
of the 2002 VTMIS Directive, the 2005 Directive on ship-source pollution and penalties 
for pollution offences, and the 2016 Directive on sulphur in fuels. These Directives are 
substantively not very demanding and none of them significantly affects rights and 
obligations in an Arctic context. The 2005 Directive does not extend to third States’ coast-
al waters and the transpolar routes in the Arctic run through the coastal waters of Canada 
and Russia. Ringbom (n 55).
59   Resolution MEPC.264(68) (http://www.imo.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/IndexofIMOReso 
lutions/Marine-Environment-Protection-Committee-(MEPC)/Documents/MEPC 
.264(68).pdf).
60   Regulation (EC) No. 782/2003 on the prohibition of organotin compounds on ships 
(OJ L 115, 2003) implements the International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-
Fouling Systems on Ships (AFS Convention), adopted 5 October 2001, entered into force 
17 September 2008 (AFS/CONF/26, 18 October 2001); and Regulation 336/2006 on the 
implementation of the International Safety Management Code within the Community 
(OJ L 64, 4.3.2006).
61   Council Regulation 2978/94 on the implementation of IMO Resolution A.747(18) on the 
application of tonnage measurement of ballast spaces in segregated ballast oil tankers 
(OJ L 319, 12.12.1994) and Directive 2001/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 4 December 2001 establishing harmonized requirements and procedures for 
the safe loading and unloading of bulk carriers (OJ L 13, 16.1.2002).
62   Either ‘static’ requirements [the rule banning single-hull oil tankers from European ports, 
since the entry into force of Regulation (EC) No. 1726/2003 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 22 July 2003 amending regulation (EC) No. 417/2002 on the accel-
erated phasing-in of double-hull or equivalent design requirements for single-hull oil 
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important share of Arctic traffic enters EU/EEA ports, and may increase in the 
future—may go further,63 though they have occasionally been proven contro-
versial, as was notably the case of the regulation for monitoring, reporting and 
verification of CO2 emissions.64 A weaker link to international rules, or to the 
territorial interests of the EU itself, will normally also weaken the legal case for 
the EU’s regulatory jurisdiction.65
 The EU, International Law and the Arctic
International legal frameworks where the EU plays a role, such as the LOSC, 
the IMO conventions (not only the Polar Code) and the 1992 United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),66 also cover the 
Arctic. Moreover, the EU is engaged in issues of direct relevance to the Arctic 
tankers (OJ L 249, 1.10.2003), to the enttry into effect (5 April 2005) of the 2003 amend-
ments to Regulation 20 of Annex I to MARPOL 73/78]; the VTMIS Directive] or ‘non-static’ 
or operational requirements [Directive 2005/35 on ship-source pollution and penalties 
for pollution offences; Regulation (EU) No. 2015/757 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 29 April 2015 on the monitoring, reporting and verification of carbon 
dioxide emissions from maritime transport, and amending Directive 2009/16/EC (OJ L 123, 
19.5.2015); 2016 Directive on sulphur in fuels].
63   Concerning the implementation and enforcement of international rules in EU ports 
through Directive 2005/35 and using port State jurisdiction rights according to Art. 218 
LOSC.
64   The European Parliament, in its first reading report on the revision of the EU emissions 
trading system (ETS), demanded that the IMO have a system comparable to the EU ETS 
available for global shipping by 2021. If this does not occur, then shipping will, accord-
ing to the European Parliament, be included in the EU ETS as from 2023 [amendments 
adopted by the European Parliament on 15 February 2017 on the proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC to 
enhance cost-effective emission reductions and low-carbon investments—EP Doc. 
P8_TA (2017)0035, proposed new chapter IIa (arts. 3ga–3ge). Available at http:// 
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2017-0035& 
language=EN; accessed 27 August 2017].
65   Some relevant considerations are: the substantive nature of the rule in question (‘static’ 
features of the ship v. questions of operation or behavior); the choice of measures taken 
to enforce the requirement in question; other legal obligations (international trade law, 
non-discrimination or abuse of right obligations), which may limit the exercise of port 
State’s jurisdiction against foreign ships; the objective of the measure (common values or 
resources); the existence or not of international rules or standards, etc. Ringbom (n 55).
66   United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, done at New York, 9 May 1992 
(UNTS, vol. 1771, I-30822, p. 107).
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at the international level via the UN and its specialized agencies (the IMO 
and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)) and subsidiary bodies 
(the United Nations Environmental Programme). Though at the beginning 
there may have been some reluctance even amongst member States them-
selves (they did not expressly confer legal personality on the EU until the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty), the EU is generally recognized as an inter-
national actor. Otherwise, without a recognized international legal personal-
ity and a CSFP, the EU could not respond efficiently to global challenges and 
endorse the values which it is committed to uphold and promote in its rela-
tions with the wider world, and defend its interests, contributing to peace, 
human rights and sustainable development in Europe and beyond.
In this sense, the EU has interacted with third States, international organiza-
tions and other international actors, and has promoted the adoption of inter-
national law rules and standards, and their modification when these were not 
wholly satisfactory for the values and interests of the EU, its States members 
and its citizens. The political, legal and material constraints on the EU’s legal 
capability and political reality in order to perform as an actor in the Arctic do 
only not apply to this geographical area, yet are also present worldwide. These 
limitations are dependent upon the area where the action is pursued. However, 
the 2016 Joint Communication affirms that the EU should take an active nego-
tiating position in relevant UN fora to encourage all countries and regions to 
assume their responsibilities, notably regarding climate change and environ-
mental protection, but also in relation to emerging challenges such as safety at 
sea and the sustainable management of land- and sea-based resources.
 The EU and ‘General’ International Law Applicable in the Arctic
The Arctic is formed by its inhabitants and a diversity of species and resources, 
spread over land territories, marine zones, ice and air space subject to sover-
eignty (land areas, internal waters and territorial sea, and the air space over 
them as well as the bed and subsoil of its territorial waters) or national juris-
diction (contiguous zones, EEZs and continental shelves) and beyond national 
jurisdiction (high seas, the international seabed Area and the air space over 
waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea). The sovereignty and juris-
diction of States and their other competences are exercised in the Arctic, as 
everywhere else, subject to ‘general’ rules of international law.
The EU has taken a leading role in several fields within the scope of ‘general’ 
international law applicable in the Arctic. As a ‘civilian’ (or ‘soft’) power, the 
EU plays an important role in international commercial, economic and finan-
cial law, human rights law, environmental law, law of the sea (e.g., sustainable 
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fisheries, protection of marine biodiversity),67 etc. Notably, the EU has com-
promised internationally in the fight to mitigate climate change, and so efforts 
towards mitigation and adaptation to climate change are particularly sup-
ported by the EU (UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol,68 2015 Paris Agreement).69 These 
efforts necessarily have an impact on the Arctic, a region highly sensitive to 
climate change.70 Moreover, all EU member States have traditionally been 
funders of scientific programmes and the EU is currently investing in Arctic 
scientific research. The EU and its member States are also promoters of the 
rights of indigenous peoples.
As mentioned above, the EU has defended its interests and values in inter-
national fora accompanying efforts on the negotiation table with the adoption 
of EU legislation complementary to, or even in contradiction with, interna-
tional rules, should those international rules be considered as producing inad-
equate solutions. Nevertheless, the EU is subject to ‘general’ international law 
and most of the EU rules are in line with internationally agreed rules and stan-
dards. Dealing with Arctic issues, the EU has an increasing tendency to avoid 
controversies with (mainly coastal) Arctic States,71 looking for international 
cooperation with Arctic States and other Arctic stakeholders and leaving the 
substantive regulation to universal institutions.
 International Arctic Law and the EU
Leaving aside the initial idea of the European Parliament to adopt an Antarctic 
Treaty System-inspired international treaty for the protection of the Arctic, the 
Commission has positioned itself with Arctic States in favour of maintaining 
the existing multilateral mechanism and refraining from the adoption of new 
legal instruments. In a 2016 joint communication, the EU considered that the 
67   See the contribution to this special issue by R Churchill (‘The EU as an actor in the Law of 
the Sea, with particular reference to the Arctic’).
68   Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
11 December 1997 (UNTS, vol. 2303, A-30822, p.162).
69   Paris Agreement. Paris, 12 December 2015 (UNTS, I-54113).
70   See, for example, N Dobson’s and S Trevisanut’s contribution to this special issue (‘Climate 
change and energy in the Arctic Ocean: The role of the EU’).
71   The exception has been, years ago, the European Parliament: not only did the 2008 
Resolution advocate the adoption of an Antarctic Treaty System-inspired specific Arctic 
international treaty, but, also with the Arctic in mind, the 2011 Resolution called for the 
EU to adopt supplementary port-State measures ‘with a view to imposing a strict regime 
limiting soot emissions and the use and carriage of heavy fuel oil’ if the international 
negotiations at the IMO did not produce the desired results. The European Parliament’s 
2014 Resolution did not retain this call.
287The European Union, the Arctic, and International Law 
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 33 (2018) 267–289
leading role in addressing the emerging issues in the region remains in hands 
of the eight Arctic States, even though these issues can be more effectively 
addressed through partnership.
In 2011, 2013 and 2017, the Arctic States have adopted, under the exclusive 
AC auspices, three agreements related to search and rescue activities,72 marine 
oil pollution response in the Arctic73 and Arctic scientific cooperation.74 Only 
the Arctic States may be ‘parties’ to the 2013 and 2017 agreements, although there 
are similar provisions related to cooperation with non-parties.75 Despite 
the existence of subjects such as navigation, piracy, terrorism, smuggling, etc., 
directly affecting the EU member States’ territories, there has thus been a 
limited participation of the EU and all non-Arctic European States have been 
excluded from the negotiation and adoption processes. The AC may become 
a proper international organization; it may broaden its competences to 
encompass even security and defence issues or the Arctic States may in some 
other way encompass cooperation in that issues. The role of the EU in AC is still 
pending, awaiting the Arctic States’ definitive decision.
72   In the 2009 Tromsø Declaration, on the occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the 
Arctic Council, the eight Arctic States decided to establish a task force to develop 
the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the 
Arctic, which was adopted in Nuuk on 12 May 2011. See the Declaration at https://oaarchive 
.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/91/06_tromso_declaration_2009_signed%20
%281%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, and the Agreement at https://oaarchive.arctic-
council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/531/EDOCS-1910-v1-ACMMDK07_Nuuk_2011_Arctic_
SAR_Agreement_unsigned_EN.PDF?sequence=8&isAllowed=y.
73   In the 2011 Nuuk Declaration on the occasion of the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the 
Arctic Council, ministers representing the eight Arctic States decided to establish a task 
force to develop the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness 
and Response in the Arctic, done at Kiruna on 15 May 2013. See the Nuuk Declaration 
at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/92/07_nuuk_declaration_ 




74   At the 8th Ministerial meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, in 2013, Ministers of the Arctic States 
mandated the creation of a Task Force ‘to work towards an arrangement on improved 
scientific research cooperation among the eight Arctic States’. The culmination of this 
work came at the 10th Ministerial meeting in Fairbanks, Alaska on 11 May 2017, with the 
signature of the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation 
(see the Agreement at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/1916).
75   Art. 18 of the 2011 Agreement and Arts. 17 of the 2013 and 2017 Agreements.
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Moreover, international (universal) maritime rules have not traditionally 
singled out the Arctic as an area where specific rules apply (Art. 234 LOSC 
is an exception),76 but this has partially changed since IMO adopted the 
‘Polar Code’ and related amendments to make it mandatory under three key 
IMO Conventions: the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS), the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships (MARPOL), and the International Convention on Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW).77
The EU has recently insisted in the necessity to deepen international coop-
eration in Arctic issues. For example, the ‘agenda for the future of our oceans’ 
refers to the promotion of regional fisheries management and cooperation in 
key ocean areas to fill regional governance gaps, and specifically to the central 
Arctic ocean. Notably, in line with its integrated Arctic policy, it is highlighted 
that ‘the EU should seek to ensure sustainable development in and around the 
region on the basis of international cooperation. In particular, it will support 
the creation of an Arctic RFMO/Arrangement and promote biodiversity pro-
tection through the establishment of MPAs’.78
76   Canada and Russia have made use of this jurisdiction, and Denmark has indicated its 
intention to do so regarding Greenland’s waters within the limits of the EEZ. The option 
of using this article is not open to Norway (except for the Svalbard archipelago’s coastal 
waters, subject to the 1920 Paris Treaty) and Iceland because their EEZ are not ice-covered 
for most of the year.
77   The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), concluded at 
London, 1 November 1974 (UNTS, vol. 1184, I-18961, p. 2), as amended; the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), concluded at London 
on 2 November 1973 and 17 February 1978 (UNTS, vol. 1340, 1–22484, pp. 62 and 184), as 
amended; and the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), done at London, 7 July 1978 (UNTS, vol. 1361, 
I-23001, p. 190). The Polar Code and SOLAS amendments were adopted during the 
94th session of IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) in November 2014; the environ-
mental provisions and MARPOL amendments were adopted during the 68th session of 
the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) in May 2015. Chapter 12 of the 
Polar Code on manning and training says that companies must ensure that masters, chief 
mates and officers in charge of a navigational watch on board vessels operating in polar 
waters have completed appropriate training, taking into account the provisions of the 
STCW and its related STCW Code. Mandatory minimum requirements for the training and 
qualifications of masters and deck officers on vessels operating in polar waters were also 
adopted by IMO’s MSC in November 2016. They shall become mandatory under the 
STCW Convention and the STCW Code from 1 July 2018. The Polar Code entered into force 
on 1 January 2017.
78   JOIN(2016) 49 final, Brussels 10.11.2016.
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 International Law and the Arctic through EU Law
Under EU law, and national and international law, EU member States are 
required to comply with EU law (treaties, directives, regulations, decisions, 
international agreements). The TEU and TFEU, and bilateral and multilateral 
international agreements concluded by the EU with third States and interna-
tional organizations (e.g., LOSC, UNFCCC) are truly international law. Most of 
the EU ‘secondary’ legal acts, which are also international law (and may be 
‘EEA-relevant’), are based on—or directly copy—rules that also feature at the 
international level (e.g., many of the EU legal acts which apply to vessels vol-
untarily entering a port of a EU member State, independently of their flag, and 
implement international IMO/ILO rules and standards).
When the EU legal acts extend beyond international rules—i.e., adding sub-
stantive requirements to universal international law, sometimes to promote a 
diplomatic negotiation, or advancing the entry into force—, it may either be 
controversial (e.g., the double-hull regulation and the regulation for monitor-
ing, reporting and verification of CO2 emissions) or it may even be found to be 
in violation of international law (e.g., the EU ban on seal products was found 
to be in violation of WTO law).
But even when EU law merely copies international rules, the EU still adds 
value to the ‘force’ or efficacy79 of these rules. This is the case when: EU law 
harmonizes its implementation across the EU and its member States, irre-
spective of formal adherence to the international rule in question; it brings 
international obligations into the realm of EU law (direct effect, primacy, etc.), 
strengthening significantly the legal tools available against EU member States 
and persons under their jurisdiction that fail to implement them;80 and it may 
extend the scope of application to non-EU member States that are parties 
to the EEA agreement. This reinforcement of international law largely com-
pensates for the lack of enforcement of several international agreements in 
some relevant Arctic States (LOSC, Kyoto Protocol to UNFCCC and 2015 Paris 
Agreement).
79   For example, the adoption at the regional level (EU/EEA) of measures based on port State 
jurisdiction avoids the risk of ‘ports of convenience’, whereby ship operators could evade 
the requirements by simply choosing another port of destination.
80   In this sense, see Ringbom (n 55).
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